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ABSTRACT
SECURE KEY AGREEMENT
USING CANCELABLE AND NONINVERTIBLE BIOMETRICS
BASED ON PERIODIC TRANSFORMATION
Laleh Eskandarian
Master Thesis, July 2017
Supervisor: Prof. Albert Levi
Keywords: Biometrics, Bio-cryptography, Cancelable Biometrics, Noninvertible
Biometrics, Periodic Transformation, Fingerprints, Key Agreement, Security Analysis.
Nowadays, many of the security-providing applications use biometric-based authentica-
tion, such as electronic banking, health and social services, commercial applications and
law enforcement. However, since each person’s biometrics is unique and not replaceable,
once it is compromised, it will be compromised forever. Therefore, it is indeed hard for
the users to trust biometrics.
To overcome this problem, in this thesis, we propose a novel protocol SKA-CaNPT: Se-
cure Key Agreement Protocol using Cancelable and Noninvertible Biometrics based on
Periodic Transformation. In this research, we use a periodic transformation function to
make our biometrics cancelable and noninvertible. At the very end of our SKA-CaNPT
protocol, the user and the server make an agreement on a symmetric shared key that is
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based on the feature points of the biometrics of the user. As a proof of concept, we apply
our SKA-CaNPT protocol on fingerprints. In our protocol, after extracting minutiae from
the fingerprints, we first employ a periodic transformation function and then we categorize
our minutiae points in a predefined neighborhood by using a threshold-based quantization
mechanism. Our SKA-CaNPT protocol runs in a round-manner and in each round, the
server decides about the acceptance or rejection of the user according to the similarity
score of the common minutiae. In addition, if the transformed data is compromised, it
can be renewed just by changing one of the inputs of our transformation function.
Besides, we apply different security analyses on our protocol. First of all, we use
Shannon’s entropy to analyze the randomness of the agreed keys, and it shows that the
generated keys have enough randomness. Secondly, to analyze the distinctiveness of the
agreed keys, we use the Hamming distance metric, results of which show that the keys
of different people are distinguishable from each other. Moreover, according to the low
IKGR (Incorrect Key Generation Rate), high CKGR (Correct Key Generation Rate) and
high attack complexity possessed by our SKA-CaNPT protocol, we can conclude that our
scheme is secure against brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks.
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O¨ZET
PERI˙YODI˙K DO¨NU¨S¸U¨M I˙LE OLUS¸TURULAN I˙PTAL EDI˙LEBI˙LI˙R
VE GERI˙ DO¨NU¨S¸TU¨RU¨LEMEZ BI˙YOMETRI˙K VERI˙LERI˙N
KULLANILDIG˘I GU¨VENLI˙ ANAHTAR ANLAS¸MASI
Laleh Eskandarian
Yu¨ksek Lisans Tezi, Temmuz 2017
Danıs¸man: Prof. Dr. Albert Levi
Anahtar So¨zcu¨kler: Biyometrik, Biyo-kriptografi, I˙ptal Edilebilir Biyometrik, Geri
Do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lemez Biyometrik, Periyodik Do¨nu¨s¸u¨m, Parmak I˙zi, Anahtar Anlas¸ması,
Gu¨venlik Analizi.
Gu¨nu¨mu¨zde, elektronik bankacılık, sag˘lık ve sosyal hizmetler, ticari uygulamalar ve hu-
kuki uygulamalar gibi gu¨venlik sag˘layan birc¸ok uygulama biyometrik tabanlı kimlik dog˘-
rulama kullanmaktadır. Fakat, her bir kis¸inin biyometrik verisi benzersiz ve deg˘is¸tirilemez
oldug˘undan, so¨z konusu biyometrik verinin gizlilig˘i bir kez ifs¸a edildig˘inde, aslında bu
biyometrik veri sonsuza dek kullanılamaz hale gelecektir. Bu nedenle, kullanıcıların biy-
ometrik verilere gu¨venmesi aslında zordur.
Bu tez ile, yukarıda bahsi gec¸en sorunun u¨stesinden gelmek adına, yeni bir protokol olan
SKA-CaNPT protokolu¨nu¨ o¨neriyoruz: Periyodik Do¨nu¨s¸u¨m ile Olus¸turulan I˙ptal Edilebilir
ve Geri Do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lemez Biyometrik Verilerin Kullanıldıg˘ı Gu¨venli Anahtar Anlas¸ması.
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Bu c¸alıs¸mada, biyometrik verileri iptal edilebilir ve geri do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lemez kılmak ic¸in
periyodik bir do¨nu¨s¸u¨m fonksiyonu kullanmaktayız. SKA-CANPT protokolu¨nu¨n sonunda,
kullanıcı ve sunucu, kullanıcının biyometrik verisinin o¨zellik noktalarına dayanan bir
simetrik paylas¸ılan anahtar u¨zerinde anlas¸ırlar. SKA-CANPT protokolu¨nu¨n kavram kanıtı
ic¸in parmak izlerini kullandık. Protokolde, parmak izlerinin o¨zellik noktaları c¸ıkarıldıktan
sonra, o¨ncelikle periyodik do¨nu¨s¸u¨m fonksiyonu kullanıyoruz ve sonrasında ise es¸ik ta-
banlı bir niceleme yo¨ntemiyle daha o¨nceden belirlenmis¸ koms¸uluk ilis¸kilerine go¨re bu
o¨zellik noktalarını kategorize ediyoruz. SKA-CANPT protokolu¨ turlu bir du¨zende c¸alıs¸ır
ve her turda sunucu, parmak izlerinden c¸ıkarılan o¨zellik noktalarının benzerlik puanına
bakarak kullanıcının kabul veya reddine karar verir. Buna ek olarak, do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lmu¨s¸ ver-
iler bir s¸ekilde ifs¸a edilirse, do¨nu¨s¸u¨m fonksiyonunun girdilerinden biri deg˘is¸tirerek yeni
bir iptal edilebilir ve geri do¨nu¨s¸tu¨ru¨lemez biyometrik veri olus¸turulabilir.
Ayrıca, protokolu¨mu¨ze farklı gu¨venlik analizleri uyguladık. I˙lk olarak, u¨zerinde anlas¸ılan
anahtarların rasgelelig˘ini analiz etmek ic¸in Shannonun entropi analizini kullandık ve so-
nuc¸lar ilgili anahtarların yeterli o¨lc¸u¨de rasgele olduklarını go¨sterdi. I˙kinci olarak, u¨zerinde
anlas¸ılan anahtarların deg˘is¸kenlig˘ini analiz etmek ic¸in Hamming uzaklıg˘ı analizini kul-
landık ve sonuc¸lar farklı insanların biyometrik verilerinin kullanımı ile olus¸turulan anahtar-
ların birbirlerinden farklı olduklarını go¨sterdi. Dahası, du¨s¸u¨k IKGR (Yanlıs¸ Anahtar
U¨retimi Oranı), yu¨ksek CKGR (Dog˘ru Anahtar Olus¸turma Oranı) ve SKA-CANPT pro-
tokolu¨nu¨n sahip oldug˘u yu¨ksek saldırı karmas¸ıklıg˘ına bakarak so¨yleyebiliriz ki o¨nerdig˘i-
miz protokol kaba kuvvet, yeniden oynatma ve kimlig˘e bu¨ru¨nme saldırılarına kars¸ı
gu¨venlidir.
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1 Introduction
In everyday life, people use traditional authentication schemes to verify their identity, in
which the secret key is either something they have (e.g. smart card, SIM card in mobile
phone), or something they know (e.g. password, PIN code). Despite the wide use of
these techniques, there are a lot of limitations. For instance, a personal device like a
mobile phone or smart card could be stolen, lost or borrowed, or a password could be
guessed. The problem of the above-mentioned methods is that the difference between
the authorized person and the imposter is indistinguishable. One way of solving such a
problem is to choose a complex password; however, because of being hard to be kept in
mind, people tend to write their passwords down, which causes a security threat. In order
to overcome these limitations, authentication using something we are (e.g. biometrics:
fingerprint, iris, face, etc) could be useful [3]. There are a lot of advantages of using
biometric-based authentication, such as, users don’t need to keep their passwords in a
secure place or remember them, or from another point of veiw, users cannot forget their
passwords or loose them. In addition, it is very difficult to forge someone’s biometrics in
comparison to forging documents.
We have to protect templates in order to avoid some problematic consequences. First
of all, if biometrics is stolen, it is lost forever; it means that in the case that someone’s bio-
metrics stolen or lost, (s)he could not replace it for his/her whole life. Secondly, because
of the fact that the users can apply their biometric traits in many different applications,
each one of these applications will be confronted with a risk when the corresponding
biometrics is compromised once. This is known as the cross matching problem of bio-
metrics. It means that if the users apply the same biometrics in different applications, they
1
could be potentially tracked. Finally, biometrics are not renewable. Users can renew their
passwords or PINs by resetting them, but not their biometric traits.
The technique that can overcome the aforementioned problems is called cancelable
biometrics [4] [5]. The main idea of cancelable biometrics is mapping original biometric
templates into a new data prior to the matching procces, and storing new biometric tem-
plate in the database [3]. Though, if the transformed biometric data is compromised, by
only changing the matching characteristics, the biometric template could be renewed. The
noninvertibility property can be introduced by applying a one-way transformation func-
tion while generating the cancelable biometrics. In that case, the template’s protection
strength relies on the transformation function.
The combination of biometrics and cryptography, which provides higher security and
privacy, is referred to as crypto− biometry or bio− cryptography. In bio-cryptographic
applications, the common encryption and decryption is applied over the data, but the se-
cret keys are driven from the biometric data. These secret keys should be (i) long enough
to avoid them being guessed by an attacker, (ii) random enough to contain sufficient en-
tropy, and (iii) distinctive enough to avoid them being forged. By this means, the security
of the system can be maintained. Though, satisfying the secure key requirements due to
the invariant characteristic of biometrics is really hard and complex. Moreover, the main
obstacle of the above-mentioned combination is that biometrics are noisy. It means that
we can only expect an approximate match of the stored template. On the other hand, cryp-
tography needs the exactly right key to pass, because otherwise the protocol will fail [6].
Thus, when designing bio-cryptographic systems, this variation should be well analysed.
For instance, error correction codes or fuzzy key binding methods, like fuzzy commitment
or fuzzy vault, can be used to handle the above-mentioned problem.
2
1.1 Our Contribution
In this thesis, we present a novel secure key agreement protocol, SKA-CaNPT: Secure
Key Agreement Protocol using Cancelable Noninvertible Biometrics based on Periodic
Transformation. Our proposed approach is based on the SKA-PB protocol, introduced
by Akdog˘an et al. [7], and the idea of using a periodic transformation function to pro-
vide cancelability and noninvertibility properties, suggested by Dang et al. [8], which are
described in detail in Section 3.1. SKA-CaNPT uses cancelable and noninvertible biomet-
rics while generating the cryptographic keys that will be agreed upon. The reason behind
this is to keep the original biometrics safe and secure so that the shared symmetric key can
be extracted directly from the stored biometric template. The properties of cancelability
and noninvertibility are fulfilled through a periodic transformation function that is applied
on the captured biometrics. As a proof of fact, we apply our SKA-CaNPT protocol on
fingerprints, which are known to be unordered set of biometrics. In other words, we apply
our protocol on unordered set of minutiae points. In order to hide the genuine minutiae
points, and thus to decrease the risk of information leakage to the attacker, a number of
fake minutiae points are generated randomly. It is important to note here that, in order
for the fake minutiae points to be indistinguishable from the genuine minutiae points, the
same periodic transformation function is also applied on the fake minutiae points as well.
Our SKA-CaNPT protocol works in round manner and in each round, the server and
the user try to agree on a symmetric shared key. First of all, they try to find a set of
common minutiae points, and then, depending on the defined threshold value and the
calculated similarity score, the user will either be accepted or (s)he will be rejected and a
new round will start. In addition, the keys generated using our SKA-CaNPT protocol can
be renewed and/or revoked if a transformed data is compromised, only by changing the
input of the transformation algorithm and applying it on the original biometric data.
The security performance of our SKA-CaNPT protocol is analyzed from different
aspects. From biometrics aspect, our method presents a high verification performance
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proved by the achieved low IKGR (Incorrect Key Generation Rate) values and high
CKGR (Correct Key Generation Rate) values. Additionally, we show that our SKA-
CaNPT protocol is resistant against brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks. On
the top of it, the quality of the agreed symmetric shared keys are high, demonstrated
through randomness and distinctiveness evaluations. Therfore, we can use the generated
keys as cryptographic keys since each key is different from the other keys, and they have
enough randomness. In addition, our protocol is resistant to any attack that compromises
the original biometrics since we use a one-way periodic transformation function to make
our protocol cancelable and noninvertible. Furthermore, we analyze the communication,
computation and storage requirements, along with the complexity of our protocol. Fi-
nally, we compare our protocol with SKA-PB protocol, which is introduced by Akdog˘an
et al. [7], and cancelable fuzzy vault approach that is presented by Dang et al. [8].
1.2 Outline
The thesis is organized into six sections. Section 2 gives background information and
Section 3 reviews the related works. In Section 4, we introduce our proposed SKA-
CaNPT protocol (Secure Key Agreement Protocol using Cancelable AND Noninvertible
Biometrics based on Periodic Transformation). In Section 5, we discuss about the perfor-
mance and the security of our SKA-CaNPT protocol, along with analyzing its complexity
and memory requirements, and we compare it with the existing other works. Finally,
Section 6 concludes our work and discusses about other possible future works.
4
2 Background Information
In this section, we describe the definitions and the notations that are utilized in this thesis.
First of all, we discuss briefly about biometrics, and then we continue with cryptography.
Thereafter, we explain about biometric cryptosystems, and finally, we present cancelable
and noninvertible biometrics.
2.1 Biometrics
If we look back to many many years ago, we can find the images of handprints and
footprints in prehistoric caves all around the world. Later, in Babylonia, researchers found
fingerprints over the clay tablets. They also found that Chinese used thumbprints on their
clay seals and in the 14th century in Persia, on official documents, fingerprints were used.
Starting from the late 1960s, in which fingerprints were very popular, the idea of using
biometrics for user identification and user authentication has been formed [9] [10].
Authenticating people by checking their personal characteristics is known as biometric
authentication. The considered biometrics can either be a behavioral characteristic, such
as typing rhythm, keyboard tapping, voice, signature or the way a person walks, or a
physical characteristics, such as fingerprint, hand geometry, iris, face or DNA. Therefore,
we can divide the biometrics into two main categories: (i) something we are (physical
biometric traits) and (ii) something we do (behavioral biometric traits).
Health problems or stress could have a direct impact on behavioral characteristics of
a user; thus, they are less stable in comparison with physical characteristics. Therefore,
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physical characteristics are supposed to be more useful and more popular for biometric
authentication.
On the other hand, biometric authentication systems have two phases: (i) enrollment
phase and (ii) verification phase. In the enrollment phase, users register their biometric
traits to the system, using which the biometric template is constructed through feature
extraction. In the verification phase, another feature vector is extracted from the newly
captured biometric trait of the same user, and it is compared with the pre-registered one.
Because of the fact that the biometrics are not exactly the same of each other in differ-
ent acquisitions, which is known as intra-person distinction, the correlation between the
newly constructed biometric template and the one from the database that has been cap-
tured in the enrolment phase is of interest. Depending on the correlation among these two
templates, a decision is made about the acceptance or rejection of the user. In this com-
parison process, some authorized people may get rejected erroneously (false rejection)
and some unauthorized people may get accepted by mistake (false accept). In this regard,
biometric systems are mostly analyzed according to their false rejection rates (FRR) and
false acceptance rates (FAR). Also, error equal rate (EER) is another way for analyzing
a biometric security system. When the FRR becomes equal to FAR, the common value
indicates EER. The biometric system becomes more secure as the EER decreases.
As mentioned above, physical characteristics of biometrics are more stable than that
of the behavioral ones. Herewith, below, we discuss briefly about fingerprint, palm, iris
and face. For fingerprint recognition, first the image of the fingertip is captured and then
the minutiae are extracted using the valleys and/or the ridges, as shown in 2.1 [1]. In
the authentication/verification phase, the images or templates that are collected at that
moment are compared with that of the ones from the enrollment phase. Identification
based on fingerprints is the oldest method among the other biometrics. It has been used
in different applications for more than a century. It is more popular due to the facts
that (i) its acquisition is easy, (ii) it includes 10 different resources that is more than the
other biometrics, and (iii) the government uses it for law enforcement and immigration
purposes.
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Besides, hand geometry recognition is a method in which the shapes of the users’hands
identify them. Hand geometry readers measure and record different dimensions of hands,
such as length, width and thickness. They record both top surface image and side image
of a hand, as given in Figure 2.2 [1]. Only 9 bytes of data is stored as a template, which in
comparison to the other biometric templates is extremely low [11]. The main shortcoming
of hand geometry is that it is not completely unique.
Figure 2.1: Fingerprint Recognition [1]
Figure 2.2: Hand Geometry Recognition [1]
Moreover, face recognition is based on recording the image of the users’whole face
so that the key features could be extracted from it. These key features consist of relative
distances between eyes, nose, mouth, jaw and cheekbones, as shown in Figure 2.3 [2].
A unique template is created according to the mentioned information just after dimension
reduction like the PCA technique, which is applied to eliminate the unnecessary compo-
nents that won’t be used during image reconstruction [12]. In face recognition systems,
features are extracted from the lines and the segmented regions based on region segmen-
tation and line of interest, as shown in Figure 2.3 [2]. After that, the ordered set of face
features are constructed according to the classification of these feature vectors. Indeed,
people recognize each other by using this method.
On the other hand, there are two different categories in eye-based authentication:
(i) iris recognition, and (ii) retina recognition, among which iris recognition is approved
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to be more accurate than retina recognition. In iris recognition, data are extracted from
the external colorful ring around the pupil, as shown in Figure 2.4 [13]. As the biometric
template of the iris, the iris-code, which is the binary string extracted from the eye image,
along with a bit mask are stored in the database. Iris-based authentication could easily be
done with checking the matching/mismatching score of two iris-codes.
Figure 2.3: Face Recognition [2]
Figure 2.4: iris Recognition
As discussed above, biometrics have physical and behavioral characteristic. Record-
ing the behavioral characteristics is much more easier than capturing the physical char-
acteristics. For instance, signatures are being collected in many different applications for
authentication and identification purposes. Also, voice could be recorded easily with a
cheap and simple device. The only problem with these methods is that they are not as
stable as physical characteristics-based methods. For instance, a user’s signature may not
be consistent, meaning that it could change over time, and thus, it could cause problems
for the corresponding signature verification system. As another example, in a voice ver-
ification system, if there exists a little noise in the background, then the spoken phrase
could not be recorded accurately, which becomes problematic for the voice verification
system. In brief, physical characteristics are utmost persistent during the users’ lifetime,
unless an injury happens.
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In this thesis, biometrics is used for key generation purposes, indeed fingerprints are
utilized in our protocol evaluations. Since, our protocol is not a pure biometric authenti-
cation/verification protocol, but rather it is a key generation/agreement protocol, we use
correct key generation rates (CKGR) and incorrect key generation rates (IKGR). The key
agreement protocol becomes more secure as the IKGR decreases and CKGR increases.
2.2 Cryptography
Cryptography is a Greek word, within which crypto means hidden or secret, and graphein
means writing. It is called to a study that makes the communication between two parties
secure in the presence of adversaries. Cryptography is not just a new knowledge, we
can see it in prehistoric Egyptian hieroglyphs: specific communication tools are used
by the high-casts to protect their community. Also, in ancient Greece, the main reason
of winning/loosing a battle was secret communication. These types of cryptography is
called conventional cryptography. The modern cryptography started from the middle of
the last century. Mr. Horst Feistel, who worked at IBM in 1977, designed Data Encryption
Standard (DES), which was the starting point of cryptography in information technology.
Nowadays, most of the communication systems, such as banking networks, internet, cell
phones and etc., are using this kind of cryptography.
Cryptography is used to provide a number of goals: confidentiality, integrity, authen-
tication and identification. In every cryptographic model, the following terms are uti-
lized [14] [15]:
(i) Plaintext is the original message,
(ii) Ciphertext is the output of the encryption algorithm,
(iii) Secret Key is the key that is used through the encryption process (it is selected
independently),
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(iv) Encryption is the process or algorithm that encodes the plaintext by using the secret
key, output of which is called the ciphertext, and
(v) Decryption is the process or algorithm that decodes the ciphertext into the plaintext
using the secret key.
The process of secure communication among two parties is shown in Figure 2.5. Addi-
tionally, it is important to note here that encrypting a plaintext with two different keys will
yield to two different ciphertexts, and likewise, encrpyting two different ciphertexts with
the same key will yield to two different ciphertexts.
In the below subsections, we describe the cryptographic primitives that we use in our
constructions.
Figure 2.5: General methodology of cryptographic secure communication
2.2.1 Symmetric Key
Cryptographic systems are divided into two different categories depending on the key dis-
tribution process: (i) symmetric key cryptography, and (ii) asymmetric key cryptography.
In the former, which is visualized in Figure 2.6, the same secret key is used for all com-
munications between the two parties, while in the latter, public keys (which are known
to everyone) and private keys (which are known only for the owner) are required for en-
cryption and decryption operations, respectively. Since our protocol uses symmetric key,
cryptography, only it will be described in detail in the following paragraphs.
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Figure 2.6: Secret Key Cryptography
In the symmetric key cryptography, in all cryptographic operations, like encryption
and decryption, the same key is utilized, and that’s why sometimes it is called as secret
key cryptography [16]. As defined in Kerckhoff’s Principle [17], the secrecy of a crypto-
graphic system depends on the strength of its secret key, since every other detail should be
public. Therefore, in symmetric key cryptography, the only thing that is important for its
secrecy is the strength of its secret encryption key. It means that an attacker should not be
able to figure out what the secret key is using a number of ciphertexts and/or plaintexts.
The most important advantage of symmetric key cryptography is its efficiency when
implementing the primitive operations [18], while the disadvantages of symmetric key
cryptography include the key exchange problem and proliferation of the secret keys. To
communicate privately, each pair of the users need unique and specific secret keys for
their communication sessions, so this may lead to proliferation of the keys. Therefore,
to establish a secure communication, a key agreement protocol should run between each
pair of the users to exchange the secret key: it is the process that should be done before
sending a message. Thus, key exchange is neither easy nor trivial, and it makes the key
management process difficult.
Key management establishes methods for generating, exchanging, using and storing
the secret keys. Key establishment could only be key distribution or key agreement be-
tween two or more parties [19] [14]. There are lots of different key distribution schemes,
but in general, it is known to be a process in which one of the users creates a secret key and
sends it to the other user through a secure channel, because otherwise, an adversary could
generate the key and send it to both of the communicating entities. On the other hand,
in key agreement process, a shared secret key is derived by two or more communicating
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parties. Different from key distribution, in key agreement, none of the communicating
parties has any information about the secret key prior to the process. It is important to
note here that the key agreement protocol should not leak any information about the secret
key to be agreed upon to the adversary.
In this thesis, we propose a novel secure key agreement protocol, in which the server
and the user agree on a secure key that is generated using the fingerprint features, as
mentioned in Section 2.1.
2.2.2 Hash Functions
Hash function is a mathematical function which converts a numerical value of an arbitrary
length to a numerical value of a fixed length, as shown in Figure 2.7. The output value of
a hash function is called a message digest or a hash value. There are two strict require-
ments that a hash function should satisfy: (i) it should provide enough randomness for the
outputs, and (ii) the output should change completely even if a bit changes in the input.
Moreover, a cryptographic hash function should contain the following properties as well:
(i) it should has pre-image resistance, which means that reversing a hash function should
be computationally hard, and (ii) it should has collision resistance, which means that for
a particular hash function output, we should not be able to find two different inputs, even
with different lengths. There are two common applications for hash function utilization,
regarding the aforementioned properties. The first one is password storage, in which in-
stead of storing the password in clear, the hash value of it is stored in the system. The
second one is data integrity check, through which users can make sure about data cor-
rectness. In addition, hash functions can also be used in digital signatures and message
authentication [20].
In the following paragraphs, SHA and HMAC are explained as they are utilized in this
thesis.
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Figure 2.7: Hash Function
Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)
NIST (National Institute of Standards and Technology) and NSA (National Security
Agency) have developed a set of algorithms in 1993, which are a family of crypto-
graphic hash functions that referred as Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). The most com-
monly known versions of SHA are SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, the details
of which are as given in Table 2.1. SHA-1 was proposed in 1995 to overcome the weak-
nesses of SHA-0, which is the oldest in the family [21]. On the other hand, the others,
i.e., SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512, are known to be the subsets of SHA-2, which
was proposed in [22]. Since 2005, NIST have decided to use SHA-2 as the standard hash
algorithm.
In our key agreement protocol that we propose in Section 4, we use SHA-256, which
has a message digest of size 256, as given in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Various SHA versions
Parameter SHA-1 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
Message digest size (in bits) 160 256 384 512
Parameter < 264 264 2128 2128
Message size (in bits) 512 512 1024 1024
Block size (in bits) 32 32 64 64
Word size (in bits) 80 64 80 80
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Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)
A keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) is a particular kind of MAC (Mes-
sage Authentication Code) that consists of a secret key and a hash function [23]. The most
important advantages of HMAC are that it is not only much more faster but also much
more efficient than symmetric encryption [14]. As mentioned in Section 2.2.2, although
the length of a hash function’s input can be an arbitrary value, its output is a fixed length
message. Herewith, the efficiency of the cryptosystem can be maximized by decreasing
the length of a long message with the use of HMAC. In other words, HMAC is a MAC
that is used to authenticate data by applying a hash function like SHA-256 over the data
with a secret key. It is mostly analogous to using digital signatures, but just HMAC uses
symmetric key cryptography, while digital signature uses asymmetric key cryptography.
In our key agreement protocol that we propose in Section 4, we use SHA-256 in our
HMAC algorithm, as also mentioned above.
2.3 Biometric Cryptosystems
We need cryptography in order to carry out a trustful communication. In traditional cryp-
tosystems, users are authenticated based on secret keys, in which if the key cannot be
kept secret, the authentication fails. Indeed, using the biometric characteristics of a user
could solve such problems. Therefore, researchers proposed a combination of cryptogra-
phy and biometrics to provide an effective solution for data security, and they named this
combination bio-cryptography or crypto-biometry.
Bio-cryptographic systems are analogous to password-based key generation systems,
just instead of traditional passwords, biometric features are used to generate a crypto-
graphic key, or to secure the cryptographic key [24]. Thus, the main purpose of devel-
oping biometric cryptosystems is either to generate a symmetric key by using biometric
features or to secure a cryptographic key with the help of biometric features [25]. We
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can categorize biometric cryptosystems to (i) key binding, and (ii) key generation. Key
binding is referred to a system in which a secure sketch is obtained by combining the bio-
metric template with a cryptographic key. On the other hand, key generation is a method
using which a secure sketch is derived directly from the biometric template, and it is used
as the cryptographic key itself.
Since cryptographic systems require the exact same key to accept a user, in key bind-
ing and key generation based biometric cryptosystems, the intra-user diferences of bio-
metric templates are problematic. To solve this type of problems, fuzzy key binding meth-
ods such as fuzzy commitment [26] and fuzzy vault [27] are presented. Among the above
techniques, the fuzzy vault scheme became popular for biometric template protection,
which has been implemented for iris [28], face [29] and fingerprint [30–34].
The most interesting context in biometric cryptosystems is key management; but, gen-
erating the key from biometric features is difficult due to the biometrics being noisy and
including intra-user variations. Chang et al. [35] and Veilhauer et al. [36] propose a user
specific quantization scheme, for generating secret keys from biometric data, in which
helper data is the intra-user variations. Besides, fuzzy extractor and secure sketch are pro-
posed by Dodies et al. [37] in the field of biometric key generation. The fuzzy extractor
generates the cryptographic keys based on the biometric features, and the secure sketch
is a helper data, which has less information leakage. The two famous methods of fuzzy
extractors are fuzzy commitment and fuzzy vault, which are described in detail in the below
paragraphs.
Fuzzy Commitment
Fuzzy commitment [26] is used to secure the biometric features of the individuals, which
are in the form of binary vectors such as the iris code. The method is composed of two
phases: (i) enrollment phase, and (ii) authentication phase, details of which are visualized
in Figure 2.8. In the enrollment phase, first a key k that is in the form of a codeword is
selected and a hash function is applied on it, H(k). Then, XOR of the biometric template
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and H(k) is calculated, which actually is the encrypted message of the fuzzy commitment
scheme. In the authentication phase, XOR of the biometric query template’s feature vector
and the encrypted message is calculated, and then the hash function is applied on the result
to check its correctness. It has been shown that, with the fuzzy commitment scheme, not
only the key but also the biometrics of the user could be reconstructed by the attacker,
with the use of error correction codes and statistical attacks [26].
Fuzzy Vault
The fuzzy vault scheme [27] is one of most popular biometric template protection schemes
that in contrast with fuzzy commitment, is applicable on unordered set of biometric data
such as fingerprints. The method is also composed of two phases: (i) enrollment phase,
and (ii) authentication phase. In the enrollment phase, first, a secret key k is selected.
After that, a polynomial P(x) is indexed with the selected secret key k. For each point of
the biometric template’s feature, the polynomial is evaluated, (x,p(x)). In order to increase
the security of these calculated values, a large number of fake points are generated, which
should not lie on the polynomial P(x). At the end, the collection of genuine and fake
points are named as the vault. In the authentication phase, assuming that the query of
unordered biometrics is x’, with the use of Lagrange interpolation, P(x) is reconstructed
using the genuine points are that determined from the query template x’. If P(x) could be
reconstructed, its coefficient, forming the secret key k’, is corrected with the help of error
correction codes, which will yield to the secret key k.
There are many researches in the literature about the fuzzy vault scheme that are based
on fingerprint [31] [33] [38], iris [28] [39] [40] and face [29] [41]. Nevertheless, various
attacks against the fuzzy vault scheme are discovered, such as brute-force attack [42],
blended substitution attack [43], stolen key inversion attack [43] and correlation based
attacks [44]. For instance, in [45], despite the fact that the authors have developed a
fingerprint based fuzzy vault scheme, the proposed method includes information leakage.
The problem happens when the authors add chaff points to the vault. These chaff points
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Figure 2.8: Fuzzy Commitment Scheme
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are close to each other and far from the genuine points. Therefore, when the attacker finds
two points that are close to each other and one of them is a chaff point, (s)he could make
sure that the other one is a chaff point as well.
2.4 Cancelable and Noninvertible Biometrics
Nowadays, using the PINs, ID cards and passwords are no longer safe and adequate for
identity verification since they could be easily stolen or shared, as discussed in Section 2.
One of the solutions to this problem is using biometric characteristics in the authentication
process. As mentioned in Section 2.1, physical characteristics are unique for each person,
such as, fingerprint, iris and face; thus using them could be a reliable solution for the
aforementioned problem. Nevertheless, biometrics based models could also cause some
serious concerns [3]: (i) biometrics are not secret, (ii) if an attacker captures a biometric
trait, it cannot be replaced easily and it will be lost forever, (iii) biometrics renewal is
impossible, and (iv) the possibility of cross matching in biometrics database is high. To
overcome these problems, cancelable biometrics [5] have been presented.
Cancelable biometrics is a concept in which the biometric template is protected through
the combination of biometric feature replacement and security. Transforming or chang-
ing the biometric features or the biometric images prior to the matching process is the
main idea of the cancelable biometric systems. The only thing that should be taken into
account is that, during the cancelability process, the natural characteristics of biometrics
should be preserved. Additionally, there are 3 important standards that a cancelable bio-
metric system should include: (i) being specific and reusable, (ii) using a unidirectional
transformation function, and (iii) possessing comparable performance [46].
In cancelable biometrics, instead of storing the original biometric template, first a
transformation function is applied on the captured biometrics and then the result is stored
in the database [3]. If this transformed version of the biometric template is compromised,
then a new transformation function can be applied on the original biometrics. Therefore,
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with this mentioned solution, the first three concerns about biometrics will be resolved.
Moreover, for solving the cross matching problem, different transformation functions can
be applied for different applications.
Cancelable biometrics can be classified into being (i) invertible and (ii) noninvertible.
In invertible cancelable biometrics, if the transformed template is compromised, then the
attacker can find the original biometric template of the user [25]. In noninvertible can-
celable biometrics, a one way transformation function is used, which means that even
if either of the transformation function and its parameters or the transformed template
is compromised, obtaining the original biomterics is computationally infeasible. There-
fore, we can make sure that the original biometrics could not be captured when we used
noninvertible cancelable biometrics.
Cancelable noninvertible biometrics presents a solution to provide privacy for the user,
in a way that, in the authentication phase, the user would not identify at all. The data that
is produced by using noninvertible transformation guarantees that the original biometrics
template will be protected [47]. As mentioned above, renewing someone’s biometric is
difficult and it is not like renewing PINs or passwords. However, cancelable biometrics
allow a user to re-issue her/his biometrics. First of all, prior to the matching process, the
original biometrics is mixed up and the new data is stored in the database. Secondly, if
the data is compromised, then the mixing parameters can be changed and a new data can
be produced instead of the compromised one. Figure 2.9 demonstrates the re-issuing of
the original biometric data on cancelable biometric systems [48].
19
Figure 2.9: Re-issuing in Cancelable Biometrics Systems
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3 Related Work and Problem Statement
In this section, we discuss the literature of the related works and we mention about the
problem statement of this thesis.
3.1 Related Work
In a biometric system, biometric template protection is of great importance. Once a bio-
metric template of a user is compromised, it could not be replaced. To overcome the
above-mentioned problem, Jein et al. propose two approaches: (i) biometric cryptosys-
tems, and (ii) feature transformation [49]. In biometric cryptosystems, the cryptographic
key of the security protocol could be generated from the biometrics itself, or it could be
binded to the biometrics. In both cases, only the helper data is stored in the database,
while the key and the biometrics template are discarded. Therefore, the attacker can not
find any information about the key and the biometrics from the stored helper data; so to
reproduce a key from another biometric, it is really useful. Besides, Dodis et al. [37]
present fuzzy extractor and secure sketch, which are two well-known approaches in bio-
metric cryptosystem. Fuzzy commitment [26] and fuzzy vault [27] are examples of fuzzy
extractor and key binding method, as mentioned in Section 2.3. On the other hand, in
feature transformation, the data is transformed prior to the matching process and then it is
stored in the database. The transformation function is a one-way function that makes re-
covering the original template from the transformed one hard.Thus, the original template
stays safe.
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Ratha et al. [3] recommend 3 types of noninvertible cancelable biometric transforma-
tion methods for fingerprint templates: (i) Cartesian transformation, (ii) polar transfor-
mation, and (iii) functional transformation, as shown in Figure 3.1. In Cartesian trans-
formation, firstly, minutiae positions are normalized according to the singular point and
then each fingerprint is partitioned into fixed sized rectangular cells. Finally, the positions
of these generated rectangular cells are rearranged based on a mapping matrix, which is
public information. In polar transformation, the polar coordinates of the minutiae are
calculated based on the position of the core point, and then these calculated polar coor-
dinates are divided into sectors. Finally, based on the translation key, and according to
the changes of sector positions, positions of the minutiae are changed. At the same time,
the minutiae angles are changed based on the variation of the sector positions before and
after the transformation. As a last method, in the functional transformation, the authors
propose to apply a local value smoothing function on the captured biometric template us-
ing a random key. Although the authors mentioned that their functional transformation is
noninvertible, it can be shown that if an attacker uses a correlation attack, (s)he can find
the original biometric templates.
Figure 3.1: Cancelable Noninvertible Transformation Functions [3]
Several research have showed that the proposed noninvertible cancelable methods in
[3] are not resistant against correlation and brute-force attacks [50] [51]. Alternatively,
Jin et al. [52] propose BioHash, which is a cancelable and noninvertible biometrics ap-
proach. In this method, first, the authors extract the most specific characteristics of the
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biometric features, and then, based on a user specific random matrix, these characteris-
tics are placed on a set of randomly generated orthogonal directions. Besides, Farooq et
al. [53] propose an approach which could be useful for implementing BioHash. In their
model, the authors convert fingerprint minutiae into a binary string area. After that, these
binary number representations are transformed to anonymous representations according
to a unique personal key. The authors claim that the proposed transformation method is
noninvertible, and also the template is cancelable. They mention that the template could
be canceled just by entering a various new key. Notwithstanding, Nandakumar et al. [49]
discuss that BioHash is indeed invertible. On the other hand, Chikkerur et al. [54] pro-
pose another method to generate cancelable fingerprint templates. In this method, from
the fingerprint image, small pieces of minutiae are extracted and then without changing
the distance between each of these small pieces of minutiae, the authors transform them to
projection matrices. Unfortunately, the accuracy of this method is shown to be poor [48].
In the below paragraphs, we describe the two valuable related works that our proposed
key agreement protocol is based upon,a biometric cryptosystem and a feature transforma-
tion method.
Secure key agreement using pure biometrics (SKA-PB)
Akdog˘an et al. [7] propose SKA-PB, secure key agreement protocol using pure biomet-
rics, in which the keys are generated using fingerprint’s minutiae points that are directly
extracted from the fingerprint images, without any other helper data. SKA-PB has two
phases: (i) enrollment phase, and (ii) verification phase.
In the enrollment phase of the SKA-PB protocol, first of all, the user provides three
fingerprint images of the same finger. Minutiae values, (x,y,type), are extracted from these
fingerprint images. The authors produce the fingerprint template based on the minutiae
set, according to the following method. Firstly, a distance threshold, Tdist is set up and
some representative minutiae points are found according to that value. The representative
is a minutia point which is utmost Tdist-away of any other minutiae that has the smallest
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y- coordinate value. To generate the final minutiae template, the server puts these three
minutiae templates on top of each other and if a minutia point shows up at least in two out
of three templates, it is added to the final minutiae template. There is also a neighborhood
relation defined in the SKA-PB protocol, which is for the coordinates xi and yi of a partic-
ular minutia, all the points that are in the range of [xi-Tdist,xi+Tdist] and [yi-Tdist,yi+Tdist]
are considered as a neighborhood minutiae. After each points’ neighborhoods are found,
the minutia values xi, yi and type of each particular point and its neighbors are concate-
nated separately, and hashed as follows, H1(xi||yi||type). Then, the authors store these
hashed values as each user’s template in the server side.
In the verification phase of the SKA-PB protocol, three different fingerprints of the
same finger are captured and fingerprint’s minutiae are extracted like in the enrollment
phase. As mentioned above, according to the predefined distance threshold Tdist, some
representative minutiae are selected and the other minutiae are mapped to their repre-
sentatives. Likewise, the most reliable minutiae, are calculated as in the enrollment
phase. In the following, to keep the genuine points safe and secure, the authors add some
chaff points according to a predefined strategy: fake points should also preserve Tdist-
neighborhood relation; in other words they should be Tdist-away from all other points,
both genuine and fake points. They developed this method to decrease the risk of infor-
mation leakage to the attacker. Therefore, like in the enrollment phase, the concatenation
of the minutiae values xi, yi and type, for both genuine and fake points, are computed.
Then, the authors calculate the single and double hash values of these minutiae values,
(xi||yi||type). In the following, they transmit the double hashes and the ID’s of each user
to the server. At this point, the server and the user try to find a common set of minu-
tiae points. Then, a similarity score is calculated and if the number of common minutiae
points is above the predefined similarity score, then the user will be accepted; otherwise,
the server will just reject the user. Since the SKA-PB protocol runs in a round manner, if
in any round the user gets rejected, the protocol will start a new round.
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Cancelable fuzzy vault with periodic transformation
Dang et al. [8] present a cancelable and noninvertible fuzzy vault model that uses a pe-
riodic transformation function on the face features of the users. The proposed scheme
includes enrollment and authentication phases. In the enrollment phase, first the feature
vector X is extracted from the user’s face images. After that, the periods P of the feature
vector X are calculated. Then, after these periods are concatenated, they are hashed to be
kept safe and stored in the database. In addition, for the proper recovery of the periods
P, in the authentication part, the authors calculate Reed-Solomon error correction code
for those P values. Then, a periodic transformation function, which is a sine transforma-
tion, is applied on the extracted face feature vectors, which is called Y. In the following,
the authors construct the fuzzy vault polynomial using a randomly generated key as the
coefficient of the mentioned polynomial. The hash value of this randomly generated key
is stored in the database to be used during the matching process later in the authentica-
tion phase. Next, to produce the genuine points for the fuzzy vault, the authors apply
the above-mentioned polynomial on the transformed feature vector Y. In addition, they
introduce a set of fake points to the fuzzy vault. All of these points, i.e., both the genuine
and the fake points, are stored in the fuzzy vault database.
In the authentication phase, the user’s face image is first recorded. Then, the face
related feature vector X’ and the corresponding period vector P’ are extracted. There-
fore, using the Read-Solomon error correction code, the calculated period vector P’ is
corrected. Then, the hash of the period vector P’ is compared to the hash of the period
vector P, and if they match, a periodic transformation function, the sine transformation,
is applied on the feature vector X’ to find the feature vector Y’. Otherwise, authentication
fails. If the transformed feature vectors Y’ and Y have enough overlap with each other
when the fuzzy vault’s decoding step is performed, then the key will be recovered cor-
rectly. After that, the hashed value of the recovered key is compared with the randomly
generated key. If they match, the user is verified; otherwise, the authentication fails.
25
3.2 Problem Statement
In most of the key binding or key generation based existing methods proposed for key
agreement, helper data is utilized along with pure biometrics, which complicates the over-
all system. Although Akdog˘an et al. [7] proposed a method that generates the key directly
from the captured biometrics without the use of a helper data, it suffers from being lack of
cancellability and noninvertibility properties. On the other hand, Dang et al. [8] proposed
a method to overcome this shortage, which makes the fuzzy vault scheme cancelable and
noninvertible. The authors apply a periodic transformation function on the face features,
which is a one dimensional vector, and they use the Reed-Solomon error correction code
in their proposed method. As discussed by Akdog˘an et al. [7], the SKA-PB key agree-
ment protocol has larger attack complexity in comparison with the fuzzy vault scheme.
Also, the SKA-PB protocol is really stronger against brute-force attacks than the fuzzy
vault approach. Therefore, to overcome the above-mentioned problems and to provide
a more secure environment, in this thesis, we combine the idea of cancelable noninvert-
ible transformation with the proposed SKA-PB protocol, and we present SKA-CaNPT, a
secure key agreement protocol that uses cancelable and noninvertible biometrics.
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4 Secure Key Agreement Protocol using
Cancelable and Noninvertible Biomet-
rics based on Periodic Transformation
In this section, we provide a detailed explanation of our proposed protocol SKA-
CaNPT: Secure Key Agreement Protocol using Cancelable and Noninvertible Biometrics
based on Periodic Transformation, which is given in Algorithm 1 and visualized in Figure
4.1. As a proof of fact, we apply our SKA-CaNPT protocol on fingerprints. Our proposed
approach is composed of two phases: (i) enrollment phase, and (ii) verification phase,
each of which is explained in the below subsections one by one as it is shown in Figure
4.2. In the enrollment phase, minutiae are extracted from the captured biometric data and
they are transformed with our periodic transformation algorithm. After that, the biometric
template of the user is calculated through the process of finding the most reliable minutiae
and the constructed templates are stored in the server database so that it can be used in the
matching process later. Moreover, in the verification phase, the most reliable minutiae is
calculated with the user’s newly registered fingerprints, after feature extraction and peri-
odic transformation operations are performed. In this phase, the template is composed of
genuine minutiae and the generated chaff points. In the following, the user and the server
try to find a common set of minutiae and a similarity score is calculated according to the
number of the found common minutiae. Depending on this the calculated similarity score,
our SKA-CaNPT protocol decides whether to reject or to accept the corresponding user.
If the user is accepted, then the server and the user make an agreement on a symmetric
key. Otherwise, the user is rejected and the protocol will srart from beginning.
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Algorithm 1 Template Generation Algorithm
INPUT: FP1, FP2, FP3, r
OUTPUT: GTs
1: Ginits = ExtractMinutiae(FP1, FP2, FP3)
2: for i = 1 : |Ginits | − 1 do
3: m1 = G
init
s (i) = (xi, yi)
4: mx = xi ÷ 2pi
5: my = yi ÷ 2pi
6: αi = xi −mx2pi
7: βi = yi −my2pi
8: x′i = arcsin(r)− αi
9: y′i = arcsin(r)− βi
10: m1 = (x
′
i, y
′
i)
11: for j = i+ 1 : |Ginits | do
12: m2 = G
init
s (j)
13: if m1.x′ ≥ m2.x− (2 ∗ Tdist)&
14: m1.x
′ ≤ m2.x+ (2 ∗ Tdist)&
15: m1.y ≥ m2.y − (2 ∗ Tdist)&
16: m1.y
′ ≤ m2.y + (2 ∗ Tdist)&
17: m1.type == m2.type then
18: m1.visited++
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: for i = 1 : |Ginits | do
23: if Ginits (i).visited < 2 then
24: Remove ith minutia from Ginits
25: end if
26: end for
27: ind← 1
28: for i = 1 : |Ginits | do
29: m1 = G
init
s (i)
30: for j = (−1) ∗ Tdist : Tdist do
31: for k = (−1) ∗ Tdist : Tdist do
32: Gs(ind) = H
1(m1.x+ j||m1.y + k||m1.type)
33: ind← ind+ 1
34: end for
35: end for
36: end for
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USER SERVER
gTu = CT (gu) ∀gu ∈ Gu
cT = CT (c) ∀c ∈ C
H2(gTu ) ∀gu ∈ Gu
H2(cT ) ∀c ∈ C
Qu = mix(H
2(gTu ) ∪H2(cT ))
FOREACH G
′
u ⊂ Gu : |G
′
u| = |G
′
s|
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|
k=1H
1(g
′
u,k)) ∀g
′
u ∈ G
′
u
IF HMACKsu(msg) == HMACKus(msg) → ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED→ RETRY
FOREACH G
′′
u,1 ⊂ G
′
u : |G
′′
u,1| = |G
′
s| − 1
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|−1
k=1 H
1(g
′′
u,k)) ∀g
′′
u ∈ G
′′
u,1
IF HMACKisu(msg) == HMACKus(msg) → ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED→ RETRY
FOREACH G
′′
u,j ⊂ G
′
u : |G
′′
u,j | = |G
′
s| − j
Kus = H
1(
|G′s|−j
k=1 H
1(g
′′
u,k)) ∀g
′′
u ∈ G
′′
u,j
IF HMACKisu(msg) == HMACKus(msg) → ACCEPT
and BREAK
IF NOT ACCEPTED→ RETRY
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Figure 4.1: Our proposed cancelable and noninvertible secure key agreement protocol
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Figure 4.2: Our proposed cancelable and noninvertible secure key agreement protocol
Our approach basically combines the SKA-PB protocol that is proposed by Akdog˘an
et al. [7] and the idea of using a transformation function that is proposed by Dang et.
al [8]. The periodic transformation function that we utilize has two important proper-
ties. The first one is similarity reservation, which means that the similarity of distances
between the original templates and the transformed templates should be preserved. This
property ensures that the two transformed fingerprint feature vectors will be similar to
those of the two original fingerprint feature vectors. The second important property is the
noninvertibility, which means that the original fingerprint templates should be protected
against compromise forever. Table 4.1 gives the definition of symbols that are used in our
SKA-CaNPT protocol.
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Table 4.1: Symbols used in SKA-CaNPT Protocol Definition
Symbol Description
FP Fingerprint
x Location of minutia on x-coordinate
y Location of minutia on y-coordinate
type Type of a minutia
x′ Location of minutia after transformation on x-coordinate
y′ Location of minutia after transformation on y-coordinate
r A random number between [−1, 1]
mx Modulus number of x-coordinate
my Modulus number of y-coordinate
CT () Cancelable and noninvertible transformation function
nu Total number of genuine minutiae on the user side
ns Total number of genuine minutiae on the server side
ncom Number of common minutiae found by the server
nkeycom Number of minutiae used in the final key agreement
H i(·) Hash function applied i times (i ≥ 0)
Gs Set of genuine minutiae on the server side
GTs Transformed set of genuine minutiae on the server side
Gu Set of genuine minutiae on the user side
gTu Transformed set of genuine minutiae on the user side
C Set of fake minutiae on the user side
CT Transformed set of fake minutiae on the user side
Qu
Set of shuffled
(
H2(gTu ) ∪H2(cT )
)
s.t. gTu ∈ GTu & cT ∈ CT
S Similarity score
Tsim Acceptance similarity score threshold
Tdist Distance threshold used in neighborhood definition
Ki(us,su)
Ki ith key generated (i ≥ 0)
us by the user to communicate with the server
su by the server to communicate with the user
HMAC(·) Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
HMACKus(·) HMAC generated using Kus
HMACKsu(·) HMAC generated using Ksu
HMACKisu(·) HMAC generated using Kisu
attc Attack complexity
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4.1 Enrolment Phase
In the enrolment phase, the user is asked to provide 3 fingerprint images of her/his same
finger, FP1, FP2, FP3, using which the minutia are extracted, as it is performed in SKA-
PB [7]. The stored information per minutiae are composed of 3 attributes: locations of
the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate, and the type of the minutia. Each minutia could
categorize to two different types: end and bifurcation. If the ridge in a point splits into
two ridges, then it is called bifurcation, and if it terminates, then it is called end. In other
respects, for adding the cancelability and noninvertibility properties, we are following the
below defined steps [8]
(i) Modulus Extraction: We use the sine function as our transformation function. Due
to the fact that the sine function is a periodic function with a period of 2pi, we find
the modules of each minutia coordinate separately, i.e. we calculate the modulus for
the x-coordinate and the y-coordinate of each minutiae. Therefore, for each minu-
tiae coordinate xi and yi, we have a definition as given in Equation 4.1, in which m
is the modulus number of x and y. Hence, the modules of these coordinates mxi
and my
i
are calculated as in Equation 4.2.
xi = αi +mxi2pi
yi = βi +myi2pi
(4.1)
mxi = [xi ÷ 2pi]
myi = [yi ÷ 2pi]
(4.2)
In the following you can find modulus extraction example:
xi = 272
yi = 87
mxi = [272÷ 2pi] = 43
myi = [87÷ 2pi] = 14
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(ii) Sine Transformation: After the pmodulus extraction operations are completed, we
transform the minutiae coordinates xi and yi as defined in Equation 4.4, using the
analogy behind Equation 4.3. We are using the sine periodic transformation func-
tion as our cancelable noninvertible transformation function, which is a many-to-
one function. It means that each one of the xi and yi coordinate values are trans-
formed to some particular x′i and y
′
i coordinate values in the transformed domain,
while for each specified x′i and y
′
i coordinate values in the original space, we could
find a lot of xi and yi coordinate values. Having many different correspondent val-
ues with the particular x′i and y
′
i coordinates, the above-mentioned discourse can
be accepted as a proof for the noninvertibility property of the sine transformation
function.
sin(xi + x
′
i) = ri
sin(yi + y
′
i) = ri
(4.3)
x′i = arcsin(ri)− αi
y′i = arcsin(ri)− βi
(4.4)
After the modulus extraction and sine transformation operations are completed, each
fingerprint’s template is produced according to its list of minutiae. For template gener-
ation, the groups of minutiae are categorized with respect to a given distance threshold,
Tdist, and a representative minutia is selected for each group of minutiae, as described
by Akdog˘an et al. [7]. Then, the minutiae are quantized according to the selected rep-
resentative: the minutiae having the same minutiae type and being utmost Tdist-away to
any other minutiae are mapped to the one minutia having the smallest y-coordinate value.
Thereafter in order to find the most reliable minutia, the server puts these fingerprint tem-
plates on top of each other. If a minutia shows up in at least two out of three fingerprint’s
templates, then as described in SKA-PB [7], it is counted as a reliable minutia, and it will
be added to the final fingerprint’s template. Finally, the concatenation of (xi||yi||type)
are calculated for each representative minutiae and its Tdist-neighborhood, as defined by
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Akdog˘an et al. [7], and their hashed values, H1(xi||yi||type), are stored in the server side,
separately for each user. This process is performed only in the server side.
4.2 Verification Phase
In the verification phase, like in the enrollment phase, 3 different fingerprints of the same
finger are acquired from the user, as discussed by Akdog˘an et al. [7]. The minutiae are ex-
tracted from these fingerprint images and for adding the cancelability and noninvertibility
properties to the extracted minutiae, we apply our periodic transformation function, i.e.
the sine function, on these minutiae, as it is done in the enrollment phase. After that, the
quantization operation is performed to designate the representative minutiae, and the most
reliable minutiae are found, again, as in the enrolment phase.
Differently, in the verification phase, in order to mask the genuine minutiae, we gen-
erate 10*Gu fake minutiae randomly and we transform those randomly generated fake
minutiae with our cancelable noninvertible transformation algorithm. The fake minutiae
points should preserve the Tdist-neighbourhood relation as well. In other words, since our
genuine minutiae points are Tdist-away from other genuine minutiae points, the fake minu-
tiae points should be Tdist-away from all the other minutiae points, in order to decrease the
possibility of information leakage to the attacker and in order not to be distinguishable
from the genuine minutiae points. Afterwards, as explained in SKA-PB [7], the features
of these minutiae points, x-coordinate, y-coordinate and type, are concatenated and two
different hash values are calculated as follows: H1(xi||yi||type) and H2(xi||yi||type).
The single hashes are utilized for generating the key and the double hashes are utilized
for verification purposes, as described below.
As discussed by Akdog˘an et al. [7], for finding the common genuine minutiae, the
following steps are carried out. First of all, in the user side, double hashes of the minutiae
points are concatenated with each user’s ID, and then they are transmitted to the server.
Secondly, the server compares each of these double hashed values with the double hashes
of its correspondent user’s minutiae points. In addition, if the user’s genuine minutiae are
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in the Tdist-neighbourhood of the server’s minutiae, then they will be counted as common
genuine minutiae as well. For distinguishing the fake minutia from the genuine minutia, a
comparison is performed between the minutiae of the user and the minutiae of the server,
and a similarity score is computed as given in Equation 4.5, where ncom is the number of
common minutiae, ns is the number of genuine minutiae on the server side, and nu is the
number of genuine minutiae on the user side.
S =
n2com
nu + ns
× 100 (4.5)
The key agreement process starts if the calculated similarity score is above a prede-
fined acceptance threshold, Tsim, as defined in SKA-PB [7]. When this is the case, firstly,
the server calculates the single hash of all common minutiae, H1(Gs), and then it calcu-
lates the double hash of them to generate the key, which the server and the user will use to
secure their communication, Ksu. In order to make sure that both the server and the user
are using the same key, HMAC of a predefined message, msg, is calculated with Ksu and
it is transmitted to the user together with the number of common minutiae that the server
has found, |G′s|.
After that, according to the number of common found minutiae, the user tries each of
the possible subsets of genuine minutiae with the equal number to generate the key. The
user sends a positive acknowledgement if (s)he can verify the HMAC. Otherwise, s(he)
tries to generate another key with another subset, until (s)he could verify the HMAC or all
the other subsets are tested. The user will send a RETRY message if (s)he cannot verify
the HMAC even all the subsets are tried.
As discussed in the SKA-PB protocol [7], if the user transmits a RETRY message
to the server, a new similarity score is calculated in the server side using |G′s| − 1 as the
common minutiae count, and if it is above Tsim, the server generates all possible keys of all
subsets of the common minutiae that the server found, which has the size equal to |G′s|−1,
and then it computes all HMACs of the predefined message with respect to these keys and
transmits them to the user. Therefore, the user sends a positive acknowledgement if (s)he
can verify any of the transmitted HMAC values with any of the keys which is generated
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based on any subsets of the genuine minutiae with the same size of |G′s| − 1. Along with
the positive acknowledgement, the user also transmits the index of the verified HMAC, i,
to the server. Otherwise, another RETRY message will be transmitted to the server. In this
case, the aforementioned process will repeat with |G′s| − 2. The overall process stops at
the j th iteration if any of the HMAC values cannot be verified by the user or the protocol
finds out that the similarity score of |G′s|−j is under the acceptance threshold, Tsim. At the
very end of the protocol, the server and the user can agree on a symmetric cryptographic
key if the user could verify any of the HMAC values. On the other hand, upon a request,
the server and the user could start from the scratch, if the protocol stops without any key
agreement.
In our SKA-CaNPT protocol, we utilize a cancelable and noninvertible transformation
function, i.e. the sine function, to transform the user’s original biometric feature vector to
a secure transformed template. By this means, if the key is compromised by an attacker,
cancelling the stored biometric template and generating a new one would be easy. To
construct a new fingerprint template, a newly generated random vector r′ will be replaced
with the previous random vector r in the cancelable and noninvertible transformation
algorithm, and then the key agreement protocol can be run with this newly transformed
biometric template from scratch.
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5 Performance Evaluation
For performance evaluation purposes, we have tested our SKA-CaNPT protocol with two
datasets consisting of 30 and 292 different subjects. The first one retrieved from Verifinger
sample database [55], each of which contains 8 images per finger. These fingerprints
are captured by using Cross Match Verifier 300 at 500 ppi [56]. The second dataset
fingerprint images collected using Papilon DS22N at 500 ppi [57] by TU¨BITAK 114E557
project team from volunteers in Sabanci University. In this dataset we collect 10 different
image from a finger. In addition, since we expect users to provide fingerprints with good
quality, our dataset is small because large datasets include bad quality fingerprints as well.
We use pre-aligned fingerprint images to test our protocol. As explained by Akdog˘an et
al. [7], the fingerprint images are aligned with Matlab R2015a, using their intensity values,
and each fingerprint’s minutiae are extracted using the Neurotechnology Biometric SDK
5.0 Verifinger [55]. In the first dataset, we use the first 3 images to produce fingerprint
templates of the server side and the other 5 are used to generate the user side’s fingerprint
templates. Hence, each subject is tested
(
5
3
)
=10 times. In the second dataset, we use 3
first image to generate a template for the server side and we use the next 7 fingerprint
images to generate fingerprint template in the user side. It means that each subject tested(
7
3
)
=35 times. As we did not utilize registration on the system and we just used alignment
for our fingerprint images, it could be a reason for some of our fails in our key agreement
protocol. Moreover, we have also carried out impostor tests, in which we check each
subject’s template against all other subject’s templates. In our SKA-CaNPT protocol,
we have used SHA-256 hash function [22], as mentioned in Section 2.2.2, so all of the
generated keys are 256 bits long.
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5.1 Performance Metrics and Parameters
The most important performance measure of a biometric cryptosystem is the Error Rate,
which is computed through Incorrect Key Generation Rate (IKGR) and Correct Key Gen-
eration Rate (CKGR). IKGR is the rate of falsely acceptance of impostor users, it means
that the percentage of the impostor users which make an agreement with server about a
key like they are genuine users and CKGR is the rate of truly accept of the genuine users,
it means that the percentage of the server correctly make a agreement on a key with the
genuine users.
On the other hand, randomness of the generated cryptographic keys is one of the
most important concerns for key agreement/generation protocols. Here, Shannon’s en-
tropy [58], which is introduced by Claude E. Shannon, is used to measure the randomness,
as given in Equation 5.1, where Ki represents the key’s ith bit and P (.) is the probability
function. According to this evaluation, the entropy value can be within the range of [0, 1],
in which 1 means maximum randomness.
H = −
∑
i
P (Ki) log2 P (Ki) (5.1)
Besides, distinctiveness of the generated cryptographic keys is another important con-
cern for key agreement/generation protocols. The reason behind this is that, after each
round of the protocol, a different key is required to be generated. Here, the distinctive-
ness of the generated keys are measured by the Hamming distance metric [59], which is
presented by the Rihard Hamming. The Hamming distance defines the difference of the
element positions in two strings of equal length, as shown in Figure 5.1.
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Figure 5.1: Hamming Distance Example
5.2 Verification Results
A similarity score is calculated for each test using Equation 4.5, which is defined in Sec-
tion 4.2. For each subject, the maximum, minimum and average scores of the system
are calculated. Each of these scores are computed using a different acceptance thresh-
old value; thus the IKGR and CKGR of the system are calculated according to different
thresholds. The results show that when the acceptance threshold is set to the maximum
score of the system, the best result is obtained. We find the average number of attempts
to make an agreement on the key which in the first dataset that is 3.068 and in the second
dataset it is 12.44. In addition, in 16 over 30 subjects the correct key is generating in the
first attempt which means in 67.46% and in 197 of 292 subjects of the second dataset in
the first attempt the correct key generated which means in 53.3%. Moreover, in the first
dataset in one subject from 30 subject the server and the user could not make an agree-
ment on a key. Therefore, the success rate according to the maximum score threshold is
96.67% for the first dataset. In the second dataset any key agreement could not occure in
1 subject out of 292 sunjects. Thus, the second dataset’ success rate is 99.65%
Figure 5.2 illustrates the percentages of IKGR and CKGR of the first dataset when
the threshold value is set to the maximum score of the system. As shown in this figure,
the optimum error rate of our SKA-CaNPT protocol achieves when the threshold set to
24.762 with IKGR 0.67% and CKGR 96.67%. The IKGR and CKGR percentages of the
second database is shown in the Figure 5.3. IKGR is 0.95% and CKGR is 90.41% when
the acceptance threshold set to 22.22. For the biocryptographic authentication system
mentioned values are absolutely sufficient.
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Figure 5.2: IKGR and CKGR of the first dataset when threshold is maximum score
Figure 5.3: IKGR and CKGR of the second dataset when threshold is maximum score
5.3 Security Analysis
In this section, we first specify our threat model. Then, we analyze the resistance of our
protocol against brute-force, impersonation and replay attacks. Finally, the qualification
of the keys generated through our SKA-CaNPT protocol is evaluated according to the
Hamming distance and entropy metrics.
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Threat Model
The attacker’s main purpose is as follows: (i) eavesdropping to find the key exchanged
between the server the and users, (ii) impersonating a genuine user, and (iii) trying to find
the original biometric template of a user. Since we are not assuming any secure channel,
the attacker can access to all of the protocol messages, including the hash values and the
HMACs which are transmitted between the user and the server. So, it is possible that the
attacker can learn the number of minutiae which are used to generate the key. Therefore,
using this value, the attacker can try the passive mode brute-force attack to guess the key.
Also, in the active mode, the attacker can apply a replay attack to impersonate a genuine
user. However, in the following paragraphs, we discuss how our protocol is resistant
against these types of attacks.
Resistance Against Brute-force Attacks
A brute-force attack is always an option for an adversary; (s)he can try all possible com-
binations of the keys. In fact, this attack is infeasible against our SKA-CaNPT protocol
since we are using 256 bits long keys in our protocol. Hence, below, we define a more
intelligent brute-force attack by using protocol messages.
All possible minutiae locations and their types are generated by this attack. Although
in our SKA-CaNPT protocol, we first transform the minutiae points prior to message
exchange, Due to the similarity distance preservation property of our cancelable nonin-
vertible transformation function, distances among the two minutiae points remains the
same. Therefore, since the maximum distance between two minutiae points is 512 for the
first dataset and 850 for the second dataset and there are 2 types of minutia, end or bifur-
cation, the attacker should generate 512× 512× 2 = 219 points and 850× 850× 2 = 221
respectively for the first and second database for a brute-force attack and apply the hash
function on them once and twice. However, as mentioned before, we do not assume a
secure channel and thus the attacker have access to Qu,which is the list of transformed
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fake and genuine minutiae. For this reason, the search space of the attacker reduces to
|Qu|. Nevertheless, as shown below, our SKA-CaNPT protocol is still secure against
brute-force attack.
As mentioned above, Qu and nkeycom, the number of minutia for generating the key, are
the information that the attacker has. The attacker should try all the subsets ofQu with the
size of nkeycom for finding all the generated keys. So, the attack complexity can be calculated
with Equation 5.2.
attc =
(|Qu|
nkeycom
)
=
|Qu|!
nkeycom!(|Qu| − nkeycom)!
(5.2)
If we find the attack complexity after each key agreement by using Equation 5.2 and
we compute the average of the attack complexity, we will have the overall attack com-
plexity of the system. With this calculation, the attack complexity of our SKA-CaNPT
protocol is 94 bits for the first dataset, which means that 294 hash and HMAC verifications
are required. Moreover, for the second database the attack complexity is 118 bits which
HMAC verification and hash which is required is 2118. Juliato et al. [60] discuss that one
block of HMAC’s computation takes 0.8977 microseconds even with a particular hard-
ware implementation. Hence, according to the aforementioned complexity, it will take
about 5.6× 1014 years in the first dataset and 9.46× 1021 years in the second dataset for
an attacker to attack our SKA-CaNPT protocol. Therefore, we can claim that our protocol
is sufficiently secure against intelligent brute-force attacks.
Resistance Against Replay and Impersonation Attacks
Impersonating a genuine user to find the correct key is referred to as replay attack. In re-
play attacks, the attacker replays the previously transmitted messages between the server
and the victim user. In order to find the generated key effectively, the attacker needs
to know the genuine minutiae; otherwise, (s)he must check all the combinations of Qu,
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which is the set of the mixed and hashed genuine and fake minutiae points. Since the
transformed version of both genuine and fake minutiae points are listed in Qu, genuine
minutiae points are indistinguishable for the attacker, so (s)he should try all the possible
combinations of Qu using Equation 5.2. Therefore, the complexity of the replay attack is
the same as that of the brute-force attack’s complexity.
In addition, if the attacker tries to generate the key with applying his/her own figer-
print, (s)he will be successful in 0.77% of the cases in the first dataset and ... of the cases
in the second dataset since it is the IKGR performance of our protocol. It is important to
note here that it is a general problem in all biometrics systems and it is not just specific to
our method.
Randomness of the Agreed Keys
Our SKA-CaNPT protocol generates 300 keys from 30 different subjects in the first
dataset. Figure 5.4 illustrates the entropy values for these keys. In this figure, each point
indicates the entropy of each individual key value, which is referred with a different key
ID. Randomness of a key has a direct relation with the entropy value. As much as the
entropy value becomes close to 1, the key gets more random. This figure shows that the
entropy of at least 84% of the keys are greater than 0.994 and the entropy of all of the keys
are greater than 0.9745, which indicates a really good randomness. These keys are gen-
erated with the help of hash functions which are applied to the common minutiae. Since
hash functions introduce some randomness to the input string, we were already expecting
a high randomness value for these results. Hence, we also calculated the entropy of the
concatenated common minutiae (x||y||type), which is shown in Figure5.5. In this figure,
the entropy of the 90.66% of the keys are above 0.98, which is a bit less than the entropy
of the generated keys; but still they provide enough randomness.
The second dataset includes 292 subjects which we generate 35 keys per subject, it
means SKA-CaNPT generate 10220 keys. The entropy values of the keys shown in Fig-
ure5.6.In this dataset approximately 99.3% of the keys have entropy values more than 0.98
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and 100% of the keys have entropy which is grater than 0.95, which shows a sufficient
randomness. As we mentioned before, we are applying the hash function on the concate-
nated common minutiae (x||y||type) for generating the keys which hash functions add a
high randomness to these keys. Therefore, in Figure5.7 the entropy of the concatenated
common minutiae is shown. The entropy value is 0.96 for 92.25% of the concatenated
common minutiae. Since we have a big dataset, having a value around 0.65 is normal.
Therefore, concatenated common minutiae have a really good randomness.
Figure 5.4: Entropy values of the generated keys for the first datasat
Figure 5.5: Entropy values of the concatenated of the transformed minutiae in the first datasat
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Figure 5.6: Entropy values of the generated keys for the second datasat
Figure 5.7: Entropy values of the concatenated of the transformed minutiae in the second datasat
Distinctiveness
Due to the intra-person distinction discussed in Section 2.3, we cannot expect to gen-
erate the same key after each key agreement run. Actually, generating the same key is
unpleasant for us. The reason behind this is that if we generate the same key and if the
key is compromised in one of the sessions, it will increase the risk of compromising mes-
sages from the other sessions as well, which is a concern for the confidentiality of the
system. Indeed, generating different keys in each key agreement run is important for us.
As discussed by Akdog˘an et al. [7], according to the quality of the fingerprint scanner,
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the finger’s pressure on the scanner, acquisition enviornment and etc., the order of the
minutiae and their quality can change. The above-mentioned situation can have either a
positive or a negative impact on the key agreement process, depending on the application.
The Hamming distances are calculated to find the differences between the keys of the
same user which are generated from the transformed minutiae, in different key agreement
protocol runs. In the first dataset, 256 bit keys possess an average Hamming distance of
approximately 120-130 bits for each different user. Moreover, as we can see in Figure 5.8,
the minimum distance is equal to 103. Additionally, in the second dataset, the average
Hamming distance of 256 bit keys for each different user possess approximately 120-130
bits, as shown in Figure 5.10, in which the minimum distance is 96 bits.
In addition to the above-mentioned calculations, we have also computed the average
Hamming distance between the keys which are generated from the transformed minutiae
of different users in order to show that different users’ keys are also different from each
other. Figure 5.9 illustrates that in the first dataset, the average Hamming distance changes
between 120-135 bits. Besides, in the second dataset, the average Hamming distance
changes from 120 to 135 bits, as shown in Figure 5.11. Hence, we can conclude that the
average Hamming distance among different users’ keys is close to the average Hamming
distance among the same user’s keys, which means that it is indistinguishable that which
of the two keys belong to different users and which ones belong to the same user.
While generating the keys, we apply a hash function on the concatenation of the minu-
tiae points. Due to the hash function’s property, small change in the minutiae concatention
causes a really huge difference on the hash values. Therefore, we need to calculate the
Hamming distance of the minutiae concatenation to find out the level of unpredictability
of our protocol. However, we compute the attack complexity of the fingerprint similar-
ity attack over the minutiae cancatenations. The length of the minutiae concatenations
vary since in each run of the protocol, the number of found common miutiae is differ-
ent. In this attack, the imposter tries to guess the concatenation of a geniune minutia’s
length, before the hash function is applied on it, according to his/her fingerprint minutiae,
by changing the bits of the minutiae concatenations. If we assume that the Hamming
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distance of the vitims’s minutiae concatenation and the imposter minutiae concatenation
is clear for the imposter and (s)he knows the length of the minutiae concatenation, we
have three different cases: (i) the imposter’s minutiae concatenation is the same as the
victim’s minutiae concatenation, (ii) the imposter’s minutiae concatenation is longer than
the victim’s minutiae concatenation, and (iii) the imposter’s minutiae concatenation is
shorter than the victim’s minutiae concatenation. In each on these cases, the bit strings
are considered equal-length. The quantity of the combination of the locations which are
different shows the attack complexity. In addition, in the third case, the imposters’s minu-
tiae concatenation bits and the victims minutiae concatenations bits are important in the
attack complexity, since the imposter should find them as well. The attack complexity is
calculated for each protocol run. In addition, we find the median of each person’s attack
complexities to learn about the average case behaviour. As a consequence, the overall
complexity of fingerprint similarity attack becomes 2251 for the first dataset, and 2252 for
the second dataset. This amount of complexity is completely sufficient for preserving the
SKA-CaNPT protocol from fingerprint similarity attack.
Figure 5.8: Average Hamming distances of the same user’s keys of the 1st Dataset
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Figure 5.9: Average Hamming distances of the different user’s keys of the 1st Dataset
Figure 5.10: Average Hamming distances of the same user’s keys of the 2nd Dataset
Cancelability and Noninvertibility of Fingerprints’ Template
In order to check the cancelability property of our protocol, we checked the Hamming
distance between the keys which are generated from the transformed minutiae with dif-
ferent random numbers. As we can see in the Figure 5.12 and Figure 5.13, the average
Hamming distance of the first and second datasets are varied between 120-135 bits. As
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Figure 5.11: Average Hamming distances of the different user’s keys of the 2nd Dataset
it is observable, the Hamming distance among the keys of the same user that are trans-
formed with different random keys are similar to the Hamming distance among the keys
of the same user that are transformed with the same random keys. This shows a really
good distinctiveness between these sets of keys. It means that whenever we need to can-
cel the fingerprints’ template, we will obtain a new template which is totally different
from the previous one and it is preserving the original template to be compromised. In
addition, similar to the analysis described in Section 5.3, the fingerprint similarity attack
complexity can be calculated by the Hamming distance among minutiae concatenations
before applying the hash function on the same user’s minutiae points that are transformed
with different random numbers, whose result yields to 2252 in both of the utilized datasets.
This amount of complexity shows that when we cancel the original fingerprints’ template,
the attacker can not substitute the original minutiae with his/her own minutiae. Therefore,
whenever we need to cancel the fingerprints’ template it will be easy and safe.
In order to justify the noninvertibility property, if we assume that an attacker finds
(X ′, Y ′) which X ′ is the location of minutia after transformation on X-coordinate and
Y ′ is the location of minutia after transformation on Y -coordinate, (s)he will try her/his
best to find (X, Y ) (X is the location of minutia on X-coordinate and Y is the location of
minutia on Y -coordinate) using the knowledge of the transformation function and other
49
Figure 5.12: Average Hamming distances of the same user’s keys generated with different random
numbers for the 1st Dataset
Figure 5.13: Average Hamming distances of the same user’s keys generated with different random
numbers for the 2nd Dataset
public data. First of all, we should mention that our periodic transformation function has
the many-to-one mapping property. It means that, based on Equation 4.3 and Equation
4.4 X can only be transformed into one X ′, and similarly Y can only be transformed into
one Y ′, while X ′ and Y ′ can be transformed into many Xs and many Y s. Besides, if
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the adversary has X ′, Y ′ and ri, (s)he could find αi and βi, but since the module mi is
unknown, the adversary cannot infer either X or Y .
5.4 Computational Complexity Analysis
The computational complexity of our SKA-CaNPT protocol is computed for the server
and the user separately by calculating the complexity of the transformation function and
calculating the number of key generation attempts.
As we mention in Section 4, our cancelable and noninvertible transformation function
is the sine periodic function. As discussed in [61, 62], the computational complexity of
sin(x) for fixed-point rational inputs are computable in polynomial space. Therefore,
both in the server side and the user side, the transforming functions’ computational com-
plexity is O(n), as n is the total number of the minutiae points. As discussed exclusively
in Section 4 and as can be analyzed from Figure 4.1, the computational complexity of the
server for key generation, can be calculated by Equation 5.3, where ncom is the number of
common found minutiae. Therefore, we can calculate the server’s average computational
complexity based on the average of all key generation attempts against all subjects. It
means that the average complexity of the server in the key generation step is 217 in the
first dataset and 29 in the second dataset. By this means, the total computational complex-
ity of the server in our SKA-CaNPT protocol is equal to 217 in the first dataset and 29 in
the second dataset, since O(n) < O(2n)
servercomplexity =
nkeycom∑
i=ncom
(
ncom
i
)
(5.3)
In the user side, as we discuss in Section 4.2, after extracting the minutiae, we trans-
form the original points by the sine transformation function. As we discussed before, the
computational complexity of this operation is O(n). Afterwards, in the key generation
step, the number of key generation attempts can be calculated according to Equation 5.4,
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in which nu is the number of genuine minutiae in the user side. Therefore, after calcu-
lating all the tests’ computational complexity of the key generation step, we can find the
average of it, which is equal to 239 for the first dataset and 241 for the second dataset.
Indeed, the total computational complexity of the user is equal to 239 for the first dataset
and 241 for the second dataset, since O(n) < O(2n).
usercomplexity =
nkeycom∑
i=ncom
(
nu
i
)
(5.4)
5.5 Communication Complexity Analysis
The communication complexity of our SKA-CaNPT protocol can be computed according
to the bits transmitted between the server and the user. First of all, the user sends a
message to the server which is the starting point of our protocol. This message includes
Qu (set of genuine and fake minutiae) and the user’s ID. Since we are using SHA-256,
Qu has 256 bits and the user ID is a 32 bit integer. In the dataset that we utilize, there are
440 and 550 minutiae points respectively for the first dataset and second dataset, in the
average. Therefore, the communication cost of the first message is equal to (440×256)+
32 = 112672 bits which is equal to 13.75 KB in the first dataset and (550× 256) + 32 =
140832 which is equal to 17.2 KB in the second dataset.
In the following, the second message transmitted from the server to the user can be
either a rejection acknowledgment or ncom and HMAC values. Actually, rejection ac-
knowledgement is just 1 bit, but if the user is accepted then the message will contain
HMAC’s value, which is 256 bits, and the number of common minutia (ncom), which is a
32 bit integer. So, the communication cost of this message is equal to 256 + 32 = 288
bits, in the worst case.
In the next step of our SKA-CaNPT protocol, the user responds to the server’s message
with RETRY or ACCEPT, both of which requires only 1 bit. If the user sends a RETRY
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message, the server can transmit a negative acknowledgement or the list of the HMAC
values. HMAC list contains
(
ncom
ncom−1
)
number of minutiae points. The average of ncom
is equal to 25 for the both datasets. Thus, the average communication cost of this kind
of a message is equal to 256 × (22
21
)
= 5632 bits. If the user can not verify any of the
HMAC values, it will send another RETRY message, which is again 1 bit. On the other
hand, if the SKA-CaNPT protocol continues with an ACCEPT message of the user, then
the positive acknowledgement is 1 bit, and the index of HMAC is a 32 bits integer. So,
the total communication cost is equal to 33 bits.
In the following steps, the server’s communication cost will change according to the
following combinatorial value:
(
ncom
x
)
, where x = ncom−2, ncom−3, ncom−4,...., nkeycom is
the number minutiae which is used in the key generation process. Therefore, until the time
that the key is generated, the communication cost of our SKA-CaNPT protocol changes
in each round. However, the key is generated with an average number of 16 minutiae
in the first dataset and 20 in the second dataset. Thereupon, the average communication
cost in the server side is equal to 256 × (25
16
)
= 523001600 bits = 65.37 MB for the first
dataset and 256 × (25
20
)
= 13601280 bits = 1.70016 MB for the second dataset. On the
other hand, in the first dataset, the total size of the messages transmitted by the server is
65.37 MB and it is 13.75 KB for the user, while in the second dataset, the total size of the
messages transmitted by the server is 1.70016 MB and it is 17.2 KB for the user. Hence,
with today’s Internet quality, the above-mentioned amounts are reasonable.
5.6 Memory Requirement Analysis
In our SKA-CaNPT protocol, the average number of transmitted minutiae is 42.4, which
it is approximately 42 for the first dataset and it is 51 for the second dataset, in the server
side. Moreover, in the server side, we are also storing each minutiae’s neighborhood
points. As we mentioned before, we have a neighborhood relation strategy, by which ac-
cording to a predefined threshold value, we are storing representative minutiae’s neighbor
points in the server. The value of Tdist here is 10. Therefore, each representative minutiae
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is represented with 21 × 21 = 441 points. It means that for each subject, the average
number of minutiae that is stored in the server side is equal to 42 × 441 = 18522 for the
first dataset, and 51 × 441 = 22491 for the second dataset. In addition, before storing
these points on the server, first SHA-256 hash function is applied on them, which means
that each point is 256 bits. The first dataset that we utilize consists of 30 subjects and the
second dataset includes 292 subjects, as mentioned before. Therefore, the total storage
size required by the server is equal to 30 × 18522 × 30 = 142, 248, 960 bits for the first
dataset, and for the second dataset it is 292× 22491× 292 = 1, 917, 672, 624 bits; in the
other meaning, for the first dataset it is 16.9 MB and for the second dataset it is 239.7 MB.
In the case that the server needs to store double hashes of the minutiae points and their
neighbors, the storage amount will become 16.9 × 2 = 33.8 MB and 239.7 × 2 = 479.4
MB for each dataset respectively.
On the other hand, the average number of transmitted minutiae is 39.65, which is
approximately equal to 40, in the first dataset, and it is 50 in the second dataset, in the
user side. Here, the neighboring points are not stored, but 10 × |Gu| chaff points are
added to the original minutiae points. It means that, on the average, in the first dataset,
we are adding 10 × 40 = 400, and in the second dataset 10 × 50 = 500 chaff points
to the original minutiae points. Therefore, in the user side, the total number of minutiae
points for the first dataset is equal to 440 points, and for the second dataset, it is 550
points. In the user side, first we calculate the single hashes of the minutiae points and then
we calculate the double hash values. Hence, in total, our SKA-CaNPT protocol requires
440×256×2 = 28.16KB of storage for a user in the first dataset, and 550×256×2 = 35.2
KB for the second dataset.
5.7 Comparative Analysis with the Related Work
In this section, we compare our SKA-CaNPT protocol with the SKA-PB protocol that is
presented by Akdog˘an et al. [7] and the cancelable fuzzy vault approach that is presented
by Dang et al. [8]. These two protocols are compared with that of ours according to IKGR
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and CKGR percentages and their brute-force attack complexities, as provided in Table 5.1,
where NA means not applicable. We also compared our SKA-CaNPT protocol with the
SKA-PB protocol with respect to replay and impersonation attack complexities together
with the randomness and the distinctiveness of the agreed symmetric keys. The reason
behind not being able to compare our protocol with the cancelable fuzzy vault approach
against these performance metrics is that the authors do not include such analysis in their
corresponding proposal.
The IKGR and CKGR of our SKA-CaNPT protocol is 0.67% and 96.67% for the
first dataset, and 0.95% and 90.41% for the second dataset. These values are 0.57% and
99.43% in the SKA-PB protocol; nevertheless, our results are still reasonable and accept-
able for bio-cryptographic authentication systems. On the other hand, the complexity of
the brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks are the same of each other in both our
SKA-CaNPT protocol and the base SKA-PB protocol, which is 294 for the 1first dataset,
and 2118 for the second dataset. In addition, the randomness of the agreed keys is 0.9745
and 0.95 in our SKA-CaNPT protocol, which is 0.98 and 0.94 in the SKA-PB protocol,
respectively for the first and second datasets; hence, they are approximately similar, as
well. Besides, the distinctiveness of the agreed keys in both of these protocols are be-
tween 120-130 bits, which are the same. As it is shown in Table 5.1 and our SKA-CaNPT
protocol successfully improves the SKA-PB protocol by means of adding the cancelabil-
ity and noninvertibility properties; despite degrading the IKGR and CKGR performance
a little. Our SKA-CaNPT protocol preserves the attack complexity, randomness and dis-
tinctiveness of the SKA-PB protocol.
In [8], Dang et al. apply their proposed scheme on face features with 40 genuine minu-
tiae points and on a polynomial of order 9 fuzzy vault. We applied this proposed method
to both of our datasets. We can represent each of the x and y coordinates of the fingerprint
values with 14 bits in both of the datasets; thus, when we concatenate them together we
have 28 bits. According to our SKA-CaNPT protocol, the agreed cryptographic keys are
256 bits. So, [256/28] is equal to 9, which means that we should compare our protocol
with the Deng et al. proposed protocol with fuzzy vault of order 9. The comparison of
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our SKA-CaNPT protocol with the cancelable fuzzy vault scheme shows that the IKGR
and CKGR of our SKA-CaNPT protocol outperforms the IKGR and CKGR of the cance-
lable fuzzy vault scheme which are 1.8% and 54.4% for the first dataset, and 2.98% and
65.95% for the second dataset. The authors of this approach computed resistance against
the brute-force attack for their approach when they used order 9 polynomial as 257. Our
SKA-CaNPT protocol’s brute-force attack complexity is 294 for the first dataset and 2118
for the second one, which in comparison with the cancelable fuzzy vault scheme’s attack
complexity is really better. In conclusion, our SKA-CaNPT protocol is stronger against
brute-force attack in comparison to cancelable fuzzy vault scheme. Since the cancelable
fuzzy vault scheme is different from our protocol in the manner that the cryptographic
keys are generated, comparing these two protocols in terms of randomness and distinc-
tiveness of the agreed keys is not applicable.
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6 Conclusions
In this thesis, we present a secure key agreement protocol called SKA-CaNPT: Secure
Key Agreement Protocol using Cancelable and Noninvertible Biometrics based on Peri-
odic Transformation. As the name of our protocol implies, we use cancelable and non-
invertible biometric features while generating the keys to be agreed, and we satisfy these
properties through the use of periodic transformation. As a proof of concept, we apply
our protocol on fingerprint images and we generate the secretly shared keys using minu-
tiae points, which means that we are not using any random data while generating the key.
Both the cryptographic keys that are agreed upon and the stored biometric templates that
are generated using our SKA-CaNPT protocol are cancelable since, if we need to renew
the biometric template, we can easily change one of the inputs of our sine transformation
function to compute a brand new symmetric shared key. Besides, the stored biometric
templates that are generated using our SKA-CaNPT protocol are noninvertible because
of the utilized periodic transformation function. In the other words, the sine function is
periodic with a period of a 2pi, because of which we cannot infer the original biometric
feature due to the sine function being many-to-one.
In our SKA-CaNPT protocol, we use chaff points in order to hide the genuine minu-
tiae. We generate these chaff points according to a predefined strategy and then we apply
our cancelable noninvertible transformation function on them to make them completely
indistinguishable from the genuine minutiae. Since adding chaff points decreases the
probability of information leakage to the attacker, it results in a higher verification perfor-
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mance. I should mention that during the key generation process, our system uses the hash
functions and threshold mechanisms as well.
We analyze the security of our proposed SKA-CaNPT protocol according to a number
of different metrics. The IKGR values are 0.67% and 0.95%, while the CKGR values
are 96.67% and 90.45%, respectively for the first and second datasets that we utilize,
which shows the verification performance of our protocol. In addition, we analyze the
strength of our protocol against brute-force, replay and impersonation attacks. The attack
complexity of our protocol is 294 in the first dataset, which means that the attacker needs
293 trials to attack our system, while it is 2118 in the second dataset, which means that the
attacker needs 2117 trials to attack our system, each of which implies a good complexity.
We also analyze the randomness of our generated keys, which shows that the entropy
of 84% of the generated keys are higher than 0.994 and the entropy of all the keys are
greater than 0.9745 in the first dataset. Moreover, in the second dataset, the entropy of
the 99.3% of the generated keys are higher than 0.98 and the entropy of all the keys
are greater than 0.95. Hence, it can be concluded that the keys are random enough to
be used as cryptographic keys. On the other hand, according to the Hamming distance
metric, we evaluate the distinctiveness of the agreed keys, which shows that there is a quite
large difference between the same person’s keys and different persons’ keys, making them
completely indistinguishable from each other.
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